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THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF
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BILL
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The Department of Agriculture throws billions of dollars at farm-
ers each year, encouraging them to grow as much as they can of cer-
tain crops. Farmers respond by doing just that. In the process, they
use fertilizers to replenish the soil, pesticides to kill the bugs, herbi-
cides to kill the weeds, and plow grassland to grow yet more crops.
The enormous yields that result exact a huge environmental cost.
This Article comprehensively documents the water pollution, soil
erosion, and habitat loss caused by current farming methods and
traces them to the Farm Bill's commodity payment programs as car-
ried out by the Farm Service Agency. As major federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the environment, these programs should be sub-
ject to the National Environmental Protection Act. This Article
shows how the Act's requirements, and the Farm Service Agency's
own environmental regulations, obligate the agency to do an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement of the commodity programs. Agency
regulations, however, categorically exclude these programs from
NEPA, but the Article argues that an outside group could success-
fully pressure compliance with NEPA and force the federal govern-
ment to finally acknowledge the significant environmental damage
caused by U.S. farm policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this time of increased environmental awareness, concern about
the environmental impacts of agriculture, and of agricultural policy,
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Georgetown University Law Center. The author
wishes to thank E. Donald Elliott for the suggested topic, and Dian
Hoffpauir and Tony Hurst for their encouragement and support.
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is becoming more widespread and farmers are now frequently find-
ing themselves on the defensive.' According to fifth-generation
farmer Art Shultheis, "the only way to convince the American peo-
ple that food produced in the USA is worth supporting is to convince
them that they are also being rewarded by increased environmental
awareness." 2 Countering this are resilient images of farmers as envi-
ronmentalists. In signing the 2002 Farm Bill, President Bush stated:
"There's no better stewards of the land than people who rely on the
productivity of the land. And we can work with our farmers and
ranchers to help improve the environment."
3
Environmental considerations may or may not influence American
farmers, but government subsidies certainly do. Since the Great De-
pression, the federal government has been subsidizing key agricul-
tural commodities, and virtually all farmers growing these commodi-
ties have been affected by government programs, either directly or
indirectly. 4 These government subsidies stimulate crop production,
"and to the extent that such increases in output impose unintended
and unaccounted for environmental costs on society, those environ-
mental costs can be seen as a form of government 'policy failure.'
5
The full ramification of that policy failure with regard to environ-
mental costs has never been fully realized by the federal govern-
ment.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) provides a logical
framework for the government to analyze the environmental impacts
1. Bill Couser, who farms 5,000 acres in central Iowa said of his corn crop,
"When we planted this crop, people said we were the villains of the world." Joel
Achenbach, So What's So Bad About Corn? As Iowa Enjoys a Bumper Crop,
Farmers Hear It From Environmentalists, Ethanol Skeptics and Other Critics,
WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2007, at AOl.
2. United States Department of Agriculture, Transcript of the Washington
State Farm Bill Forum with Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns and Moderator
Bob Hoff, Northwest Ag Information Network, Cheney, Washington, (November
3, 2005).
3. See George W. Bush, Remarks by the President Upon Signing the Farm
Bill, May 13, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020513-
2.html.
4. Nigel Key et al., Farm-Level Production Effects from Participation in
Government Commodity Programs: Did The 1996 Federal Agricultural Im-
provement and Reform Act Make a Difference?, 87 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. (2005)
1211, 1212.
5. Jan Lewandrowski et al., The Interface Between Agricultural Assistance
and the Environment: Chemical Fertilizer Consumption and Area Expansion, 73
LAND ECON. 404,405 (1997).
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of 75 years of federal farm subsidies. Passed in 1969 at the height of
the environmental movement, NEPA has had a massive impact on
governmental decision-making with regard to the environment.6 Yet
farming, so mythologically coupled with the environment, has never
been subject to NEPA. The categorical exclusion of farm subsidies
from NEPA's procedural requirements ignores the very real envi-
ronmental problems caused by those subsidies. Part I of this paper
explains the types of subsidies given to farmers under the Commod-
ity Title of the Farm Bill. Part II provides an overview of NEPA and
the responsibilities of the Farm Service Agency-the agency respon-
sible for carrying out commodity subsidy programs-under NEPA
and supplemental agency regulations. Part III explains why com-
modity subsidies trigger NEPA. Subsidies are major federal actions
that significantly affect the environment through a myriad of inter-
connected ways, notably worsening water and soil quality. Farm
Service Agency regulations themselves should force NEPA compli-
ance, as explained in Part IV. The substance of that compliance
could be modeled on the Farm Service Agency's environmental im-
pact statement for another Farm Bill program, the Conservation Re-
serve Program. The paper concludes by discussing various ways in
which outside environmental groups might force commodity subsidy
program compliance with NEPA.
II. THE BROAD SCOPE OF FARM BILL SUBSIDIES
A. The Commodity Programs of the Farm Bill
The 2008 Farm Bill has its roots in federal attempts to help farmers
during the Great Depression. The original price supports and volun-
tary production limits of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
were struck down by the Supreme Court, 7 but were replaced with a
more comprehensive system of policies on production control and
price supports in 1938 and 1949.8 That system has continued, with
6. Richard J. Lazarus,- The Greening of America and the Graying of United
States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's First Three Dec-
ades in the United States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 75 (2001).
7. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (conditioning the payment of a
government subsidy to a farmer on reducing planted crops was beyond the powers
of the national government).
8. John H. Davidson, The Federal Farm Bill and the Environment, 18 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENv'T 3, 4 (2003); Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. §
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some variation, through the many omnibus Farm Bills enacted every
four or five years since then. Over the years, the many laws con-
tained in the omnibus Farm Bill have become ever more comprehen-
sive and complex. 9 The many separate titles of the Farm Bill affect
a variety of programs, including support for farmers, conservation
measures, nutrition programs such as food stamps, aid to rural com-
munities, and money for agricultural research.' 0
These programs are extremely costly. The Congressional Research
Service estimates that as of March 2007, the total estimated six-year
(FY2002-FY2007) cost of the major provisions of the 2002 Farm
Bill was $271.1 billion. 1' Nearly two-thirds of this amount was for
the food stamp program, while $92.9 billion was for the three major
categories of farm support: farm commodity programs, conservation,
and trade.1 2 These programs are defined as mandatory spending,
which means that eligibility is determined by their authorizing stat-
ute-the 2002 Farm Bill-and any person or business that meets the
eligibility requirements is entitled to the benefits authorized by the
law. 13
The bulk of money spent for farm support is in Title I, the Com-
modity Title of the Farm Bill. Commodity support programs cost
$72.9 million during the years covered by the 2002 Farm Bill.14 The
commodity programs support the incomes of farmers producing cer-
tain "program" crops, including grains, oilseeds, cotton, peanuts,
sugar, and milk. Five crops-corn, wheat, cotton, rice, and soy-
beans-account for over 90 percent of government commodity pay-
ments to farmers.' 5  Commodity-related spending fluctuates from
year to year depending on farm market prices; during the 2002 Farm
1281 (2000); Agricultural Act of 1949, 7 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). Every Farm Bill
is based on previous ones, and, should a new Farm Bill fail to pass, agricultural
programs revert to the provisions of the Agricultural Act of 1949. Carolyn Dimitri
et al., USDA Economic Research Service, Econ Info. Bull. No. 3, The 20th Cen-
tury Transformation of U.S. Agriculture and Farm Policy, 13 (2005).
9. See Jean Yavis Jones et al., Congressional Research Service, Order Code
RL30956, What Is A Farm Bill? (2001).
10. SeeH.R. 6124, 110th Cong. (2008).
11. Ralph M. Chite, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RS22694,
Farm Bill Budget and Costs: 2002 vs. 2007, 1 (2008).
12. Id.
13. Id. Other smaller programs authorized in the Farm Bill are discretionary
programs that require annual appropriations.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Jim Monke, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RS21999, Farm
Commodity Programs and the 2007 Farm Bill 1 (2007).
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Bill cycle, spending ranged from a high of $16.9 billion in FY2006
to a low of $8.0 billion in FY2004. 16 The Congressional Budget
Office estimates spending under the 2007 House-passed Farm Bill
and Senate Agriculture Committee Farm Bill to be $286.2 billion
and $285.8 billion, respectively. 17
The commodity payments given to farmers are authorized by Con-
gress in the farm bills, and then carried out by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA). The Farm Bill establishes which commodi-
ties are covered, when payments are made, and the payment rates
and target rates for covered commodities.18 Within USDA, the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), working through the Farm
Service Agency (FSA), disburses payments to farmers. Payments
are made through three different programs, and the same farm can
receive payments through all three programs. The commodity sup-
port programs provide three major types of subsidies to farmers
growing program crops: direct payments, counter-cyclical payments,
and non-recourse loans. 19
B. Types of Subsidies Given to Farmers under the Commodity Title
1. Direct Payments
The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996,
also dubbed the "Freedom to Farm" Act, established the direct pay-
ment program. That Farm Bill marked the end of policies intended
to control supply and stabilize farm prices. The Act's free-market
philosophy removed government limits on planting and focused on
finally phasing out subsidies. 20 In order to wean farmers off subsi-
dies, the Farm Bill offered farmers annual, declining fixed cash
payments. 21 Yet one year into the Act, collapsing farm prices led
16. Chite, supra note 11, at 2.
17. Id. at 5.
18. H.R. 6124, 110th Cong. §§ 1103, 1104, 1202 (2008).
19. See H.R. 6124, 110th Cong. §§ 1101-1210 (2008).
20. Dan Morgan, Gilbert M. Gaul & Sarah Cohen, Farm Program Pays $1.3
Billion to People Who Don't Farm, Wash. Post, July 2, 2006, at AO 1.
21. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 §3 111-118, 7
U.S.C. §§ 7211-7218 (2000).
238 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W REVIEW
Congress to authorize annual emergency payments to farmers, which
reached $20 billion in 1999.22
Direct payments are fixed payments to farmers growing certain
commodity crops based on historic acres and yield. 23 Basing pay-
ments on historic acres and yield, rather than crops that are currently
grown, is intended to provide farmers more freedom to decide which
commodity crops to grow, or to let land fallow. The payments are
unrestricted-farmers get them whether or not they grow any crops,
or whether crop prices are high or low. 24 Direct payments remain
the same for all five years covered by both the 2002 and 2008 Farm
Bills.25
2. Counter-cyclical Payments
The 2002 Farm Bill also added counter-cyclical payments. These
provide support counter to the cycle of market prices as part of a
"safety net" in the event of low crop prices. 26 Counter-cyclical pay-
ments for a commodity are only issued if the effective price for a
commodity is below the target price for the commodity. 27 The pay-
ments grew out of the loan deficiency payments program that began
with the 1985 Farm Bill. These payments were originally intended
to prevent the storage requirement of the marketing loans from dis-
torting supply. However, the system did not work effectively, and
between 1998 and 2001, low market prices for commodity crops led
to ad hoc market loss assistance payments given to producers.28
During that time, "the loan program became a major source of
'countercyclical' income support since the 1996 farm bill had no
22. Darrell Ray et al., Rethinking US Agricultural Policy: Changing Course to
Secure Farmer Livelihoods Worldwide 9 (2003). Yet despite the payments, U.S.
net farm income dropped by 16.5 percent from 1996 to 2001. Id.
23. H.R.6124, 110thCong.§ 1103(2008).
24. Dan Morgan, Gilbert M. Gaul & Sarah Cohen, supra note 20.
25. Id.; Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 § 1103, 7 U.S.C.A. §
7913 (2007).
26. Farm Service Agency, Direct and Counter-cyclical Payment Program Fact
Sheet (2006), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/newsReleases?area=newsroom
&subject=landing&topic=pfs&newstype=prfactsheet&type=detail&item=p _2008
0626_insupen dcpsignup.html (last visited Jul. 10, 2008).
27. Id.
28. Paul C. Westcott et al., USDA Economic Research Service, Agric. Info.
Bull. No. 778, The 2002 Farm Act Provision and Implications for Commodity
Markets 5, (2002).
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other price-triggered supports." 29 The counter-cyclical payments
were designed as a replacement for the ad hoc payments.
Like direct payments, counter-cyclical payments are based on his-
torical area and yields and are not tied to current production of the
covered commodity. Counter-cyclical payments are made when the
higher of the loan rate or the season average price is below the target
price minus the direct payment rate. 30 This payment structure, how-
ever, means that farmers are not compensated for the actual price at
which they sell their crops. Rather, farmers receive a subsidy based
on the market price for the crop on any day of the year, regardless of
whether the crop is sold on that day at that price. 31 The program has
been criticized because farmers lock in their subsidies when prices
are low and sell when prices are higher.32
3. Non-recourse Marketing Loans
Marketing, or non-recourse, loans are the prices a farmer receives
at harvest for commodity crops actually produced. If the market
price is below the loan rate, the government essentially buys the
commodity at the loan rate.33 The marketing assistance loans date
back to the Agricultural Act of 1949.34 Unlike the newer direct and
counter-cyclical payments, these subsidies are actually tied to what
farmers produce. Marketing assistance loans for covered commodi-
ties are termed "non-recourse" because the commodity is pledged as
loan collateral and producers have the option of delivering the
pledged collateral to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) in
satisfaction of the repayment of the outstanding loan.35 As a result,
CCC acquires commodities that are forfeited or delivered under
29. Jim Monke, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RS21604, Mar-
keting Loans, Loan Deficiency Payments, and Commodity Certificates 2 (2004).
30. Id.
31. Dan Morgan, Sarah Cohen & Gilbert Gaul, Growers Reap Benefits Even in
Good Years, Wash. Post, July 3, 2006, at AO1.
32. See, e.g. at Id. For last year's crop, farmers sold their com for an average
of $1.90 per bushel, only 5 cents below the national floor price. But they received
a payment averaging 44 cents, a difference amounting to $3.8 billion.
33. Davidson, supra note 8, at 5.
34. Farm Service Agency, Price Support: Non-Recourse Marketing Assistance
Loan, http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subj ect=prsu&topic=col
(last visited July 10, 2008).
35. Id.
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these non-recourse loans, and, acting through the Farm Service
Agency, maintains provisions for their distribution and disposal.
36
III. AGENCY ACTION REQUIRED BY THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION ACT
A. Overview of NEPA
The National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) is our na-
tion's "basic national charter for protection of the environment."
37
Prior to NEPA and its contemporary environmental legislation, regu-
lation of the country's natural resources was based on economic
benefit, and detrimental environmental impacts were generally ig-
nored by federal agencies when they engaged in planning. In re-
sponse to this, NEPA obligates all federal agencies to take a "hard
look" at the environmental consequences of any proposed action. 38
The Act's most significant provisions, sections 101 and 102, state a
congressional intent to protect the environment and establish an
agency's procedural duty to investigate and consider the environ-
mental implications of any action it carries out. The procedural ob-
ligation imposed by NEPA requires all agencies to utilize a "system-
atic, interdisciplinary approach" in planning 39 and to give "presently
unquantified [sic] environmental amenities and values... appropri-
ate consideration in decision-making along with economic and tech-
nical considerations." 40 Environmental impacts are to be considered
at the earliest possible time in the planning process "to insure that
planning and decisions reflect environmental values."
41
The Act's "broad national commitment to protecting and promot-
ing environmental quality," is ensured though "important 'action-
forcing' procedures." 42  These "action-forcing" procedures require
all federal agencies to prepare a "detailed statement ... on the envi-
36. Policy for Certain Commodities Available for Sale, 71 Fed. Reg. 40,641
(July 18, 2006) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 1402).
37. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2007).
38. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(b) (2000).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1975).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (1975).
41. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (2007).
42. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348-49
(1989).
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ronmental impact" for every "recommendation or report on propos-
als for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment." 43 All federal agen-
cies must comply with NEPA "unless existing law applicable to the
agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes compliance impos-
sible."44
B. Agency Responsibilities under Council on Environmental
Quality and U.S. Department ofAgriculture NEPA Regulations
Title II of NEPA established the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity (CEQ) and outlined its advisory responsibilities under the Act.45
In 1978, CEQ promulgated final regulations, whose major purpose
was to provide uniform procedures for federal agencies that had pre-
viously had varying NEPA procedures.46 All federal agencies must
prepare an environmental assessment to determine whether an action
is likely to have "significant" environmental effects. 47 An environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) must be prepared if the environmental
assessment concludes that the impact is significant.48 If, after the
environmental assessment, the agency concludes that the action will
not have a significant effect on the environment, the agency may
issue a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) and may then pro-
ceed with the action. 49 Actions can be given "categorical exclusion"
from these requirements if they are determined to not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the environment.
50
43. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1975). These "detailed statements" must include:
"(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environ-
mental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii)
alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term
uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented." Id.
44. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (2007).
45. Although NEPA does not specifically direct the CEQ to issue regulations,
the President expressly granted the CEQ such authority in Executive Order No.
11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (March 5, 1970), as amended by Exec. Order No.
11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26967 (May 24, 1977).
46. Implementation of Procedural Provisions, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (Nov. 29,
1978).
47. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (2007); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a) (2007).
48. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2007).
49. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2007).
50. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2007).
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The Council on Environmental Quality also requires agencies to
adopt supplemental procedures detailing when to prepare an envi-
ronmental assessment.5 Like other agencies, the procedures adopted
by USDA incorporate and adopt the regulations published by the
Council on Environmental Quality. 52 The USDA Departmental Pol-
icy for NEPA describes certain actions and lists certain agencies that
receive categorical exclusions from NEPA. 53 Neither the Commod-
ity Credit Corporation nor the Farm Service Agency are listed
among the USDA agencies excluded from NEPA.
54
C. Categorical Exclusion of Commodity Subsidy Programs under
Farm Service Agency NEPA Regulations
Since the Farm Service Agency is not given categorical exclusion
from NEPA, FSA adopted its own NEPA regulations further sup-
plementing those of USDA and CEQ. These regulations detail how
and when environmental assessments and EISs are done, and ex-
clude certain agency actions from NEPA requirements. Commodity
subsidies are categorically excluded from NEPA requirements under
these regulations. Among FSA actions normally not requiring an
assessment or an EIS are "Commodity Income and Support and Dis-
aster Protection Programs. 55 Although the language in Title I of the
Farm Bill does not actually use the terms "commodity income and
support," the 2002 Farm Bill defines a commodity program as "a
program administered by the Secretary under which price or income
support, or production or market loss assistance, is provided to pro-
ducers of agricultural commodities ...56 The Economic Research
Service of USDA also discusses the commodity programs as "com-
modity-based income support.",57  By exempting these programs
from NEPA regulations, the Farm Service Agency, and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture in general, do not have to consider the environ-
mental effects of the subsidy programs.
51. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(a) (2007).
52. 7 C.F.R. § lb.1 (2007).
53. 7 C.F.R. § lb.3 (2007).
54. 7 C.F.R. § lb.4 (2007).
55. 7 C.F.R. § 799.10(b)(2) (2007).
56. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 § 1613, 7 U.S.C. § 7996
(2007).
57. Roger Claassen et al., USDA Economic Research Service, Econ. Res. Rep.
No. 44, Integrating Commodity and Conservation Programs: Design Options and
Outcomes 4 (2007).
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Environmental evaluations are nevertheless required for all pro-
grams and can lead to further environmental review. FSA regula-
tions provide that an environmental assessment or EIS may be re-
quired "where the presence of extraordinary circumstances or other
unforeseeable factors indicate that some other level of environmental
review may be appropriate. 5 8 However, such circumstances have
never been found. FSA has never done an environmental assessment
or EIS for the commodity income and support programs.59
IV. COMMODITY SUBSIDIES SHOULD TRIGGER NEPA REQUIREMENTS
A. Subsidies are a Major Federal Action
The commodity subsidies meet the definition of a major federal ac-
tion that must comply with NEPA. NEPA is triggered by "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment." 60 The commodity subsidies are a federal action carried
out by the Farm Service Agency on behalf of the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC). The Commodity Credit Corporation was origi-
nally established in 1933 under a Delaware charter, but was trans-
ferred to the USDA in 1939, and reincorporated on July 1, 1948, as a
Federal corporation within USDA by the Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration Charter Act. 61 The CCC is wholly government-owned and
managed by a Board of Directors, all of whom are USDA officials.62
The CCC itself has no operating personnel, and its commodity sub-
sidy programs are carried out through the personnel and facilities of
63the Farm Service Agency, itself an agency within USDA.
58. 7 C.F.R. § 799.10(c) (2007).
59. For instance, in implementing Title I of the 1996 Farm Bill, the environ-
mental evaluation found there would be no significant environmental impact, so
neither an environmental assessment nor EIS would be needed. Implementation of
the Farm Program Provisions of the 1996 Farm Bill, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,544 (1996).
60. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C) (2000).
61. U.S. Department of Agriculture, About the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion, http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=about&subject=-landing&topic=
sao-cc-ac (last visited July 15, 2008); see also 15 U.S.C. § 714 (2000).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 714(q) (2000).
63. U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 61.
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The subsidies are a "major" federal action for several reasons.
First, the subsidies involve a great deal of money.64 Second, the
subsidies are national in scope, given to farmers located in all
states. 65 Third, the subsidies are given to a large number of farms,
covering half of the nation's 938 million acres of farmland.66 The
major scope of the subsidy program is evident from what is included
as farms. The United States Department of Agriculture defines
farms as "any place from which $1,000 or more of agricultural prod-
ucts were produced and sold, or normally would have been sold"
over the course of a year.67 This rather expansive definition allows a
wide variety of farm, and even non-farm, operations to collect com-
modity payments.
68
B. Subsidies Significantly Affect the Environment
Farmland covers a vast amount of the physical United States, and
what crops are grown and how they are grown are strongly influ-
enced by commodity subsidies. Non-federal agricultural and forest-
lands occupy 1.4 billion acres or nearly 70 percent of the contiguous
United States. 69 Farmland occupies roughly half of the land in the
contiguous United States, and the majority of this land is privately
owned.70 In 2002, 938 million acres were farmed, with nearly half
of that amount used as cropland.7 1 While only 25 percent of U.S.
farms receive farm commodity payments, those farms control about
80 percent of cropland and 50 percent of all agricultural land.72
64. $13,125,211,134 was given to farmers through commodity programs in
2005. See Environmental Working Group, Farm Subsidy Database,
http://farm.ewg.org/sites/farmbill2007/progdetail 1614.php?fips=00000&progcode
=farmprog (last visited July 12, 2008).
65. See U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Ser-
vice, 2002 Census of Agriculture (2004), available at http://www.agcensus.usda.
gov/Publications/2002/index.asp.
66. See Claassen, supra note 57, at iv.
67. U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 65.
68. See Morgan, supra note 20.
69. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2007 Farm Bill Theme Papers: Conserva-
tion and the Environment 1 (2006), available at http://www.usda.gov/docu-
ments/FarmBill07consenv.pdf.
70. Davidson, supra note 8, at 3.
71. U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 65.
72. Claassen, supra note 57, at iv.
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1. Subsidies Encourage Farmers to Grow Commodity Crops, Even
on Environmentally Sensitive Land
Subsidies influence crop production because farmers are paid a
dollar amount based on the yield of crop produced (through the mar-
keting loan program) or capable of being produced (through direct
and counter-cyclical payments). 73 Direct and counter-cyclical loans
were "decoupled" from prices or production in the 1996 Farm Bill;
farmers are now given lump-sum payments on eligible acres used for
growing program crops, rather than receiving payments based on
current market prices or production levels. 74 Despite the decoupling
from production, these payments nevertheless encourage farmers to
grow program crops, as opposed to growing other types of crops or
letting land fallow. 75  The decoupled payments and non-recourse
payments create numerous incentives for farmers to grow programs
crops, 76 and yields continue to grow every year.77
Under the commodity programs, farmers are paid solely based on
yield, not environmental practices. Although farmers must minimize
73. See H.R. 6124, 110th Cong. §§ 1001(13), 1202 (2008). The Act relies on
the definition of "payment yield" from the 2002 Farm Bill, which set payments
under the direct and counter-cyclical programs based on the 1995 yield of com-
modity crops. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 §§ 1102, 1302, 7
U.S.C.A. §§ 7912, 7952 (2007).
74. For an explanation of coupled and decoupled farm payments, see Paul C.
Westcott & C. Edwin Young, USDA Economic Research Service, Agric. Econ.
Rep. No. 838, Farm Program Effects on Agricultural Production: Coupled and
Decoupled Programs, in Decoupled Payments in a Changing Policy Setting 7, 8
(2004).
75. Key, supra note 4, at 1218 (participation in decoupled commodity subsidy
programs significantly affects decisions to plant program crops); see also Westcott
& Young, supra note 74, at 11-14 (decoupled payments indirectly influence agri-
cultural production decisions through raising overall farm income). But see Karl
Beitel, US Farm Subsidies and the Farm Economy: Myths, Realities, Alternatives
(2005), available at http://www.foodfirst.org/backgrounders/subsidies (arguing
that as measured by inventories of commodity crops in relation to usage, subsidies
do not cause overproduction of commodity crops).
76. Bruce Babcock & Chad Hart, Risk-Free Farming? 10 Iowa Ag Rev. 11
(2004) (cited in Government Accountability Office, Farm Program Payments Are
an Important Factor in Landowners' Decisions to Convert Grassland to Cropland
60 (2007)).
77. For example, farmers now harvest 20 percent more corn from each acre
than just a decade ago, and yields in the past three years were the highest ever,
according to USDA statistics. Dan Morgan ET AL., supra note 31.
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the environmental impact of their activities,78 they are only required
to create a conservation compliance plan for crops grown on "highly
erodible cropland. ' '7 9 Further, farmers are not penalized for taking
environmentally sensitive land out of Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) contracts in order to grow crops; as soon as the land is planted
with commodity crops, farmers can receive direct or counter-cyclical
payments. Farmers declined to extend or re-enroll CRP or extend
nearly 4.9 million acres of CRP lands expiring between 2007 and
2010.81 In addition, although farmers must certify that they are not
growing crops on converted wetlands,8 2 they continue to convert
native grasslands--critical for wildlife habitat, water filtration, and
soil erosion prevention-to crop production. The nation's private
grassland decreased by almost 25 million acres from 1982 to 2003,
with most of the grassland converted to cropland. 83 Over half of this
land was classified as non-highly erodible, and therefore not subject
to conservation requirements, and even when on land deemed highly
erodible, "the potential profits from cropping the land usually out-
weigh the perceived costs associated with controlling soil erosion."
8 4
In a recent study, the Government Accountability Office concluded
that Farm Bill conservation programs are "at odds with farm pro-
grams that provide incentives for conversions of grassland to crop-
land.
'58 5
78. See H.R. 6124, 110th Cong. § 1106(2008).
79. U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 69, at 4. Highly erodible crop-
land makes up about a third of U.S. cropland. See infra text accompanying note
147.
80. H.R. 6124, 110th Cong. § 1101(a) (2008).
81. See Farm Service Agency, CRP Enrollment Statistics and Program Sum-
mary 39-42 (2008), available at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Intemet/FSAFile/an-
nualconsv_2007.pdf.
82. H.R. 6124, 110th Cong. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (2008).
83. Government Accountability Office, supra note 76, at 4. One study in cen-
tral North and South Dakota reported a loss of 144,000 acres of grassland to crop
production between 1984 and 2002, and another study in Montana and South and
North Dakota reported losses of over 60,000 acres of grassland in 2006 alone.
Martha G. Roberts et al., Potential Impacts of Biofuels Expansion on Natural Re-
sources: A Case Study of the Ogallala Aquifer Region 1 (2007), available at
http://www.edf.org/documents/701 _Potential%20Impacts%20of/o20Biofuels%2
OExpansion.pdf.
84. Government Accountability Office, supra note 76, at 5.
85. Id. at 25. The report covered both commodity subsidies and the availabil-
ity of crop insurance, and found that the latter may have the biggest influence in
decisions to convert grasslands. See id. at 4. Crop insurance is another important
subsidy provided to farmers under the Farm Bill that produces many of the same
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2. Subsidies Increase Farmers' Use of Pesticides and Fertilizers
The agricultural monocultures encouraged by commodity subsidies
require large applications of pesticides and fertilizers in order to ob-
tain high yields. By reducing the risk of depending on returns from
only one or a few crops, subsidies have played a large role in the
increasing specialization of farms; in 1900, farms grew an average of
about five commodities, but now average only one commodity per
farm. 86 As agriculture has become more specialized, it has also be-
come more intensive. Agricultural price supports encourage more
intensive farming practices, increasing the use of agricultural chemi-
cals.87 Reduced crop diversity significantly increases crop losses
due to insects and pathogens and reduces soil organic matter. 88
These problems lead to increased use of pesticides and fertilizers,
and the increased use of fertilizer in turn often increases pathogen
and insect populations. 89 While populations of undesirable species
thrive in monocultures, habitat for wildlife, including birds and other
animals that eat pest insects, 90 is reduced, compounding the need for
pesticides. Corn, which receives the largest share of subsidies, is a
particularly high-input crop that requires more herbicides, insecti-
cides, and nitrogen fertilizer than other crops in order to achieve the
high yields encouraged by U.S. agricultural policy.91
Commodity programs also more directly contribute to higher use
of farm chemicals. By raising prices and reducing price variations in
program crops, subsidies create higher marginal revenues for inputs,
environmental effects as commodity subsidies, but is outside the scope of this
paper.
86. See Dimitri, supra note 8, at 2.
87. Richard E. Just & John M. Antle, Interactions Between Agricultural and
Environmental Policies: A Conceptual Framework, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 197, 199
(1990).
88. P.A. Matson et al., Agricultural Intensification and Ecosystem Properties,
277 Sci. 504, 505-06 (1997).
89. Id. at 507.
90. Id at 507.
91. David Pimentel, Ethanol Fuels: Energy Balance, Economics, and Envi-
ronmental Impacts are Negative, 12 Nat. Res. Research 127, 130 (2003). Between
2003 and 2005, corn growers received $17.63 billion in subsidy payments, $10
billion more than the next highest-paid crop. Environmental Working Group,
Policy Analysis Database, Top Programs in United States (2007),
bttp://farm.ewg.org/sites/farmbill2007/regionl614.php?fips=00000 (last visited
July 2, 2008).
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thus motivating additional input use.92 For example, compared with
farmers who do not participate in commodity programs, corn farmers
receiving subsidies significantly increased herbicide use in all crop-
ping sequences, "supporting the conventional view that commodity
programs directly contribute to greater herbicide use in corn produc-
tion." 93
C. Farming Causes Widespread Water Pollution and Soil Erosion
Despite the environmental effects of farming practices on the large
percentage of the U.S. that is cropland, farms are not governed by
environmental laws. 94 This is best exemplified by the Clean Water
Act. Unlike factories and sewage treatment plants, the water pollu-
tion caused by agriculture is not subject to regulation under the Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), established
in the Clean Water Act.95 The Ninth Circuit has held that a body of
water can be so polluted by agricultural non-point sources of pollu-
tion as to be listed under § 303(d) of the Clean Water Act, which
provides water quality standards. 96 Nevertheless, this does not mean
that the discharging parties have to get a permit, just that the water
body has to be listed. Although "pollutant" is defined to include
"agricultural waste discharged into water," 97 the Act specifically
exempts agricultural storm water discharges and irrigation return
flows from the regulatory regime.98 The combination of subsidies
and the lack of regulation under environmental laws has created a
92. Biing-Hwan Lin et al., Factors Influencing Herbicide Use in Corn Produc-
tion in the North Central Region, 17 Rev. Agric. Econ. 159, 162 (1995). Inputs
can include fertilizers, pesticides, seed, and labor. See Economic Research Ser-
vice, Commodity Costs and Returns: Glossary, http://www.ers.usda.gov/
Data/CostsAndReturns/glossary.htm (last visited July 10, 2008).
93. Biing-Hwan Lin, supra note 92, at 167.
94. The exemption of farms from environmental laws has a long history. See
generally J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law,
27 Ecology L.Q. 263 (2000). Ruhl calls this the "anti-law" of farms and the envi-
ronment. The anti-law comes in two forms. Some laws are structured so that
farms escape most if not all of the regulatory impact. Other laws expressly exempt
farms from regulatory programs that would otherwise clearly apply to them. Id. at
293.
95. Clean Water Act § 402(l)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1) (2000).
96. Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002).
97. Clean Water Act § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000).
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
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situation in which farmers are paid to convert natural ecosystems to
agriculture and ignore the environmental problems that then arise.
1. Agriculture is the Leading Source of Water Pollution
The most troublesome of the environmental effects of agriculture
is water pollution. Agriculture is currently the leading cause of wa-
ter pollution in the U.S. 99 EPA's National Water Quality Inventory,
which inventories the degree of impairment of U.S. waters and the
source of that impairment, found that agricultural activities are re-
sponsible for nearly 40 percent of impairment in rivers and streams,
and 30 percent of impairment of lakes. 100 Agricultural nonpoint
source pollution is primarily sediment, containing both pesticides
and fertilizers, 10' which pose different environmental problems.
a. Pesticide and Herbicide Pollution Affects Drinking Water
Supplies and Harms Aquatic Ecosystems
Pesticides and herbicides infiltrate rivers and groundwater used to
supply drinking water. Rivers that serve as drinking water sources in
several midwestern states growing commodity crops are heavily pol-
luted with herbicides, and the affected communities may "sustain
intense exposure at times, particularly when heavy rains follow field
applications."' 1 2  A U.S. Geological Survey study of Midwestern
streams taken after spring field applications found triazine herbicides
contaminating ninety percent of the streams, with thirty-four percent
of the samples exceeding EPA drinking water standards for the her-
99. See Office of Water, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National
Water Quality Inventory 2002 Report to Congress ES-2 (2002). See also U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Section 319 Success Stories: Volume III, 1
(2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/Section319lIlintro.htm (last
visited June 29, 2008) ("[N]onpoint sources constitute the leading sources of water
pollution in the United States today [with] ... agriculture as the most widespread
source of pollution").
100. Office of Water, at 9, 10, 13, 14.
101. See id. at 9 (noting that sediment is the primary source of pollution in riv-
ers and streams).
102. James Stephen Carpenter, Note, Farm Chemicals, Soil Erosion, and Sus-
tainable Agriculture, 13 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 190, 198-99 (1994) (quoting Judith D.
Soule & Jon K. Piper, Farming in Nature's Image: An Ecological Approach to
Agriculture 36-37 (1992)).
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bicide Alachlor."' 0 3 Alachlor, already banned in Canada, has been
classified by the EPA as a probable human carcinogen.' 
04
Similarly, groundwater used to supply drinking water is heavily
polluted. EPA has found seventy-four different pesticides in the
groundwater of thirty-eight states, and "Aldicarb, the 'most acutely
toxic pesticide registered by the EPA,' has been found in sixteen
states."' 105  "[I]n California alone, twenty-two different pesticides
have been found in groundwater as a result of normal farming prac-
tices." 10 6 Pesticides and other pollutants leaching into groundwater
is particularly troublesome, as more than "97 percent of the nation's
rural drinking water comes from underground aquifers, and over 50
percent of the nation's population relies on groundwater as its source
of drinking water." 1
07
Beyond concerns for drinking water, these chemicals affect aquatic
ecosystems and the life forms they support. Atrazine, the second
most widely used weedkiller in the U.S. and one used particularly
for growing corn, has appeared in some watersheds at high enough
levels "to potentially harm amphibians, fish and aquatic ecosys-
tems."' 108 In many agricultural areas, atrazine levels are sustained at
high levels for several weeks, potentially affecting several endan-
gered and threatened species of animals and plants. 10 9 Moreover,
the synergistic effects of pesticides are only beginning to be studied,
but preliminary studies indicate that the normal combination of pes-
ticides in agricultural runoff can have far worse effects than when
pesticides are tested individually, even when each of the pesticides
individually was far below the level that would have triggered ef-
fects according to individual studies. 10
103. Id. at 199.
104. Id. at 200.
105. Id. at 199-200.
106. Id. at 200.
107. Ruhl, supra note 94, at 287 n.163 (citing Erik Lichtenberg & Lisa K.
Shapiro, Agriculture and Nitrate Concentrations in Maryland Community Water
System Wells, 26 J. Envtl. Quality 145, 145 (1997)).
108. Juliet Eilperin, High Weedkiller Levels Found in River Checks, Wash.
Post, Dec. 8, 2007, at A06.
109. Id. Due to concerns about the chemical's hormone-disrupting effects on
amphibians, the pesticide was banned in the E.U. in 2005. Id.
110. Symposium, Waste Discharge Requirements: Beyond the Point Source, 57
Hastings L.J. 1281, 1282-83 (2006).
[VOL. XX
2009] ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF COMMODITY SUBSIDIES 251
b. Fertilizer Runoff Causes Hypoxia in Coastal Areas
Unlike pesticides and herbicides, fertilizer is not inherently toxic,
but fertilizer runoff from farms also has lethal consequences. Fertil-
izer applications are often poorly targeted, and it is estimated that
from 40 to 60 percent of nitrogen applied as fertilizer is used by the
plants, with the rest left in the soil or lost."1 Some of the nitrogen
enters drinking water sources; "EPA found nitrate in more than half
of the 94,600 community water system wells and in almost 60 per-
cent of the 10.5 million rural domestic wells." 112 Some wells were
found to have levels exceeding EPA's minimum recommenda-
tions,113 presenting concerns for human health. 114
Of greater concern is the disastrous effect of fertilizer on coastal
estuaries. Nitrogen enters surface waters through run-off, and, as it
travels down river to the ocean, leads "to increased algal production
and increased availability of organic carbon within an ecosystem, a
process known as eutrophication. '' l l  Increased algal production
uses up most of the oxygen in the water, creating a hypoxic (or low-
oxygen environment) that is inhospitable habitat for fish, shellfish,
and most forms of marine life. 116
The world's second largest zone of oxygen-depleted coastal waters
is in the northern Gulf of Mexico at the terminus of the Mississippi
River system. The size of the Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone reaches
up to 22,000 km2 in mid-summer. 117 This hypoxic zone is largely
111. Matson, supra note 88, at 507.
112. Roger Claassen et al., USDA Economic Research Service, Agric. Econ.
Rep. No. 794, Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads: Guideposts on a
Changing Landscape 2 (2001).
113. Id.
114. "High nitrate concentrations in drinking water represent a human health
concern, causing methemoglobinemia." Matson, supra note 88, at 507.
115. National Centers for Coastal Ocean Science, Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia
Assessment, Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico: Progress towards the completion of
an Integrated Assessment (2000), available at http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/prod-
ucts/pubshypox.html.
116. See Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium, Hypoxia in the Gulf of
Mexico, http://www.gulfbypoxia.net (last visited June 28, 2008).
117. Id. The severity of this problem has not gone unnoticed. Justice Kennedy,
in a largely unrelated aside, noted with alarm that "nutrient-rich runoff from the
Mississippi River has created a hypoxic, or oxygen-depleted, 'dead zone' in the
Gulf of Mexico that at times approaches the size of Massachusetts and New Jer-
sey." Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2246-47 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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caused by agricultural use of fertilizers. 118 "As much as 15 percent
of the nitrogen fertilizer and up to 3 percent of pesticides applied to
cropland in the Mississippi River Basin make their way to the Gulf
of Mexico." 119 Agricultural run-off of nitrogen-rich water directly
causes eutrophication, often within days of major run-off events. 120
Other coastal water bodies also experience the same phenomenon.
"Recent research found that 44 estuaries, along all coasts ([fully] 40
percent of major U.S. estuaries) exhibited highly eutrophic condi-
tions, caused by nutrient enrichment."' 12 1 Over the last 40 years, the
volume of the Chesapeake Bay's dead zone has more than tripled,
and in many summers "comprises almost a quarter of the water in
the mainstem" Bay. 122 The growth of hypoxia in the Gulf and the
Chesapeake is of concern because as hypoxia worsens, ecological
and fisheries effects become progressively more severe, ranging
from localized loss of catch to complete system-wide loss of fishery
species. 123
2. Growing Commodity Crops Increases Soil Erosion
"Soil erosion involves the breakdown, detachment, transport, and
redistribution of soil particles by forces of water, wind, or grav-
118. See, e.g. "Two-thirds of the nitrogen in the Mississippi River comes from
use of fertilizer and manure on agricultural lands . . ." Marc Ribaudo, "Dead
Zone" in the Gulf- Addressing Agriculture's Contribution, 1 Amber Waves 37
(2003), available at www.ers.usda.gov/amberwaves/november03/Findings/dead-
zone.htm. "Nonpoint sources contribute about 90 percent of the nitrogen and
phosphorous discharging to the Gulf. Agricultural activities are the largest con-
tributors of both nitrogen and phosphorous." Donald A. Goolsby et al., Flux and
Sources of Nutrients in the Mississippi-Atchafalaya River Basin 14 (1999). Nitro-
gen loading in the Mississippi River comes not just from fertilizer, but also other
agricultural sources, including soil inorganic nitrogen and manure. Id.
119. Claassen, supra note 112, at 2.
120. See J. Michael Beman et al., Agricultural Runoff Fuels Large Phytoplank-
ton Blooms in Vulnerable Areas of the Ocean, 434 Nature 211, 213 (2005).
121. Claassen, supra note 112, at 2.
122. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, The Chesapeake Bay's Dead Zone: In-
creased Nutrient Runoff Leaves Too Little Oxygen in 40 Percent of the Bay's
Mainstem in July (2006), http://www.cbf.org/site/DocServer/DeadZoneFact-
Sheet_May06.pdfdocID=5583 (last visited June 30, 2008).
123. Robert J. Diaz & Andrew Solow, Ecological and Economic Consequences
of Hypoxia: Topic 2 Report for the Integrated Assessment on Hypoxia in the Gulf
of Mexico 37 (1999), available at http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/products/hypox
t2final.pdf.
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ity.' 124 The loss of soil organic matter to erosion has been one of
the best documented ecosystem consequences of modem agricultural
practices. 125 Soil erosion reduces "the ability of the soil to provide
nutrients, [water] and air, and a place for roots to take hold."'' 26
Long-term studies of soil loss following conversion of land to agri-
culture have documented significant decreases in soil carbon. 127 On
agricultural cropland, soil erosion "has on-site impacts on soil qual-
ity and crop productivity, and off-site impacts on water quantity and
quality, air quality, and biological activity."'
12 8
The amount of sediment eroding from agricultural areas is directly
related to land use-the more intensive the use, the greater the ero-
sion. The rate and amount of soil loss is directly "influenced by
cropping systems, such as the amount of [fertilizer used], crop cov-
erage of the soil, tillage practice, and the length and type of fal-
low."'129 Far "more sediment erodes from row crop fields such as
corn[,] than from pastures or woodlands."' 30 The commodity pro-
grams in the Farm Bill encourage as much production as possible
from the land, and pay farmers to grow row crops, thereby discour-
aging more beneficial practices that would decrease soil erosion.
a. Soil Erosion Causes Water Pollution and Impairs
Wildlife Habitat
Sediment in surface water is largely a result of soil erosion. "De-
pending on a variety of factors, between 25 and 40 percent of soil
that erodes from a field will reach a water body."' 3 ' Sediment
buildup in water causes a myriad of problems. It reduces the useful
life of reservoirs, clogs ditches and irrigation canals, and blocks
navigation channels, all of which can increase the cost of water
124. Natural Resources Conservation Service, National Resources Inventory,
2003 Annual NRJ: Soil Erosion 1 (2007), available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/
technical/NRI12003/SoilErosion-mrb.pdf.
125. Matson, supra note 88, at 506.
126. Carpenter, supra note 102, at 204.
127. Matson, supra note 88, at 506.
128. Natural Resources Conservation Service, supra note 124, at 1.
129. Matson, supra note 88, at 506.
130. Committee on Water Implications of Biofuels Production in the United
States, National Research Council, Water Implications of Biofuels Production in
the United States 13 (2007), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?
isbn=030911361X&page= 13.
131. Ruhl, supra note 94, at 278.
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treatment and dredging operations. 132 Sediment increases the prob-
ability and severity of floods by raising streambeds and filling
streamside wetlands.133  Impacts on wildlife can be especially se-
vere. Sediment can destroy or degrade aquatic wildlife habitat and
damage commercial and recreational fisheries.'
34
Another related problem is increased soil salinization. Drainage of
agricultural lands, a common practice in Midwest and Upper Mid-
west farmlands, causes sediment build-up in surface water, worsen-
ing water pollution. 135 Drainage also increases soil and water salin-
ity as salts-both naturally occurring and added through chemicals
on farmland-concentrate in evaporating water.1 36 "This salinized
water has potentially devastating effects on downstream aquatic sys-
tems."'
137
b. Soil Erosion Threatens Long-term Land Productivity
Of more immediate concern to farmers, long-term soil productivity
is also threatened by soil erosion. Since the 1950s, the problem of
nutrient depletion in soil has been treated by "various forms of soil
chemotherapy, chiefly nitrogenous fertilizer, at least by farmers who
could afford it."'138 Although it is often argued that soil erosion has
no significant effect on long-term production, this assumes that more
pesticides and fertilizers will be used in order to maintain a certain
level of output. 139 As discussed previously, the reliance on pesti-
cides and fertilizers cause lasting environmental impacts in addition
to the problems caused by sediment build-up.
132. Marc Ribaudo & Robert Johansson, Water Quality: Impacts of Agricul-
ture, in Agricultural Resources and Environmental Indicators 33, 34 (2006).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See John H. Davidson, Factory Fields. Agricultural Practices, Polluted
Water and Hypoxic Oceans, 9 Great Plains Nat. Resources J. 1, 10-11 (2004).
136. Id. at 11.
137. Ruhl, supra note 94, at 281-82. Return flows from cropland in Califor-
nia's Central Valley were high in selenium which collected in vegetation and
small animals eaten by waterfowl, and thus built up to disastrous levels in water-
fowl. See Harrison Dunning, Confronting the Environmental Legacy of Irrigated
Agriculture in the West: The Case of the Central Valley Project, 23 Envtl. L. 943,
953-54 (2000).
138. J.R. McNeill & Verena Winiwarter, Breaking the Sod: Humankind, His-
tory, and Soil, Sci., June 11, 2004, at 1629.
139. Carpenter, supra note 102, at 206.
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Fortunately, the creation of the Conservation Reserve Program in
the 1986 Farm Bill has significantly improved erosion rates. Soil
erosion has decreased by 450 million tons since the Conservation
Reserve Program's inception. 140 The Natural Resources Conserva-
tion Service of USDA measures erosion by a tolerable level of soil
loss. This is defined as "the maximum amount of loss per acre per
year that will permit a high level of crop productivity to be sustained
economically and indefinitely."' 141 "In 2003, 102 million acres[, or
28 percent of all cropland,] were eroding above soil loss tolerance
rates. 142  This is down from the 40 Percent of cropland eroding
above soil loss tolerance rates in 1982.1 Water erosion on cropland
also dropped during this period from an average of 4 tons per acre
per year to 2.6 tons per acre per year; "wind erosion rates dropped
from 3.3 to 2.1 tons per acre per year."144
Despite these gains, soil erosion continues to threaten much of the
country's agricultural land. All erosion on U.S. cropland decreased
43 percent between 1982 and 2003, but the amount of soil that
erodes annually is staggering: 1.75 billion tons of soil eroded in
2003.145 Erosion is of greatest concern on what is deemed "highly
erodible cropland." Highly erodible cropland is generally steeper
and less fertile, requires more fertilizer and other chemicals to main-
tain production, and can be damaged by high erosion rates. 146 In
2003, of the approximately 368 million acres of cropland in the
United States, 100 million acres were considered highly erodible
land. 147 This was down from 124 million acres of highly erodible
land in 1982. 14 And soil erosion disproportionately impacts certain
regions. Over half of water erosion in 2003 occurred in just two of
the country's twelve major river basis-the Missouri and the Souris-
140. James M. McElfish, Jr. et al., Inventing Nonpoint Controls: Methods,
Metrics and Results, 17 Viii. Envtl. L.J. 87, 91 (2006) (since the 1985 Farm Bill,
"USDA funding programs have strongly influenced state programs aimed at re-
ducing nonpoint source pollution" from agricultural soil erosion).
141. Pierre R. Crosson & Sterling Brubaker, Resource and Environmental Ef-
fects of U.S. Agriculture 105 (1982) (quoted in Carpenter, supra note 102, at 204).
142. Natural Resources Conservation Service, supra note 124, at 3.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2.
145. Id. at 1.
146. Carpenter, supra note 102, at 204-05.
147. Natural Resources Conservation Service, supra note 124, at 3.
148. Id.
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Red-Rainy/Upper Mississippi. 149 These river basins cover the Mid-
west and Upper Midwest, the largest areas of commodity grain crop
production in the country. 15
0
V. AGENCY REGULATIONS REQUIRE NEPA COMPLIANCE
A. Farm Service Agency Regulations Require an EIS of the
Commodity Programs
Although Farm Service Agency (FSA) regulations categorically
exclude commodity subsidies from NEPA compliance, those same
regulations indicate that an EIS of the commodity programs must be
done. Environmental evaluations, the first step in the NEPA proc-
ess, are required for programs that might have significant impacts on
the environment. 151 This includes "proposed legislation, a new pro-
gram, a major change in a program, an action related to a program or
an action related to part of a program...,,152 This then becomes the
basis for determining whether an environmental assessment and/or
an environmental impact statement is needed. 153 The commodity
programs of the Farm Bill are not new programs, but each new Farm
Bill presents a major change in these programs. 154 And each new
Farm Bill begins with proposed legislation.
FSA regulations also indicate that ongoing programs can trigger an
EIS. Among FSA activities likely to have significant environmental
impacts are the activities requiring environmental evaluations-
legislative proposals, new program implementation, and major
changes in ongoing programs-with the addition of "major envi-
ronmental concerns with ongoing programs."'155 This rather expan-
sive wording dictates that the concerns that have been expressed 15
6
149. Natural Resources Conservation Service, supra note 124, at 2.
150. U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 65.
151. 7 C.F.R. §§ 799.3-4 (2007).
152. 7 C.F.R. § 799.4 (2007).
153. 7 C.F.R. § 799.4 (2007).
154. For instance, in the 2008 Farm Bill, there are changes to payment limits, a
modification of loan rates and target prices among commodities, and a new reve-
nue counter-cyclical payment option, among other program changes. See H.R.
6124, 110th Cong. (2008).
155. 7 C.F.R. § 799.9(b) (2007).
156. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 8; Ruhl, supra note 94; C. FORD RUNGE,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FROM FARM TO MARKET, IN THINKING
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about the environmental impacts of farm policies should trigger an
EIS of FSA programs. The regulations require that initial NEPA
involvement in these program categories begin at the earliest possi-
ble stage-when FSA begins developing proposed legislation, be-
gins planning for implementing programs, "or receives notice that an
ongoing program may have a significant adverse impact on the qual-
ity of the human environment." 7 It could be that FSA has not re-
ceived notice that commodity subsidies may harm the environment,
or, more likely, that FSA, and the USDA in general, has chosen to
ignore their own regulations.
B. Individual Farms Receiving Subsidies Should Trigger NEPA
Requirements
Individual farm participation in FSA programs is categorically ex-
cluded from NEPA requirements, 158 despite their cumulative signifi-
cant effects on the environment. This violates CEQ regulations re-
garding categorical exclusions. Under CEQ regulations, actions can
be given "categorical exclusion" from NEPA's requirements if they
fall within "a category of actions which do not individually or cumu-
latively have a significant effect on the human environment and
which have been found to have no such effect.. ."59 NEPA spe-
cifically covers the cumulative effect of federal programs. Although
the effect on the environment from individual farms may be minor,
the Eighth Circuit held in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group
v. Butz that these effects cannot be disaggregated into "minor federal
actions" for which NEPA would be inapplicable.160 For, as the court
noted, "There has been increasing recognition that man and all other
life on this earth may be significantly affected by actions which on
the surface appear insignificant."' 6'1 FSA regulations merely state
that "[i]ndividual farm participation in ... price support and loans
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 200
(Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty, eds., 1997).
157. 7 C.F.R. § 799.9(c) (2007).
158. 7 C.F.R. § 799.10(b)(2) (2007).
159. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2007) (emphasis added).
160. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th
Cir. 1974) (the magnitude of the federal action cannot be considered separately
from its impact on the environment, as this would allow for "minor federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" to which NEPA
would not apply, contrary to the clear intentions of the statute).
161. Id. at 1322.
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and other similar or related programs will not significantly affect the
quality of the human environment."1 62 This blanket statement does
not provide the reasons why FSA reached this conclusion, and ig-
nores the cumulative affect of tens of thousands of farms receiving
federal subsidies.
Furthermore, some individual farms very likely significantly affect
the environment. In 2002, 77,970 farms comprised over 2,000 acres,
much larger than the nation's average farm size of 441 acres. 163 Al-
though USDA does not track commodity payments given to individ-
ual farms by farm size, many of these large farms receive subsidies
since the bulk of commodity payments-78 percent-go to medium-
sales ($100,000-$249,999) and large-scale farms. 164  Yet only 43
percent of conservation payments go to farms that also receive
commodity payments,' 65 and most conservation payments do not go
to medium-sales and large-scale farms. 16 6 This means that many
large farms in the U.S. receive commodity payments, but do not pur-
sue the conservation practices that can mitigate some of the adverse
environmental effects of commodity farming. 167
FSA's regulations recognize that individual farms may have a sig-
nificant impact. If there is such a possibility, the local county com-
mittee makes an environmental evaluation, and if shown to have a
significant effect, "the county committee will not approve the [FSA]
practice implementation until after the completion of the NEPA-EIS
process ... According to these regulations, if it were established
that all farms receiving subsidies could significantly affect the envi-
ronment, then the EIS process would have to be done prior to indi-
vidual farms receiving subsidies.
162. 7 C.F.R. § 799.9(d) (2007).
163. U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 65.
164. Robert A. Hoppe et. al., Structure and Finances of U.S. Farms: Family
Farm Report, 2007 Edition, iv (2007).
165. U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 69, at 28.
166. In 2004, retirement, residential, and low-sales small farms received 62
percent of conservation program payments and small farms accounted for 82 per-
cent of the land enrolled by farmers in the Conservation Reserve and Wetlands
Reserve Programs. U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 69, at 11.
167. See infra p. 30 and note 186.
168. 7 C.F.R. § 799.9(d) (2007).
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C. The Farm Service Agency's EIS of the Conservation Reserve
Program as a Model for an EIS of the Commodity Programs
An EIS of commodity subsidies could easily be modeled on the
EIS of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) done by the Farm
Service Agency. A Final Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement was done regarding FSA implementation of the Conserva-
tion Reserve Program under the 2002 Farm Bill. 169 Like the com-
modity subsidies, CRP is a re-authorized program in the Farm Bill.
Unlike the commodity subsidies, CRP has not been categorically
excluded from NEPA. 70 This may be due to the fact that FSA's
NEPA regulations were promulgated in 1980, and have not been
updated since then to include subsequent programs such as CRP,
which first appeared in the 1985 Farm Bill. 171 CRP is also re-
authorized in the 2008 Farm Bill, and another EIS for the program
will likely appear after final passage of the 2008 Farm Bill.
The Conservation Reserve Program is a voluntary program offer-
ing incentives and assistance to farmers and ranchers for establishing
conservation practices on privately-owned environmentally sensitive
land.172 In the EIS, FSA considered four alternatives and the effect
of those alternatives on numerous environmental resources including
soil erosion, water quality, and wildlife. 173 Also considered were the
"social and economic aspects of the affected environment [which]
consist of farming from a national perspective and of rural communi-
ties that may be affected by CRP enrollment."' 174 FSA selected the
Proposed Action Alternative as "the most balanced approach to
achieving long-term program goals."'' 75 Perhaps not coincidentally,
169. Commodity Credit Corporation & Farm Service Agency, Record of Deci-
sion for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on the Conservation
Reserve Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,848 (2003) [hereinafter Conservation Reserve
Program EIS].
170. See 7 CFR § 799.10 (2007).
171. The FSA NEPA regulations appeared in 45 Fed. Reg. 32,313 (1980).
172. Conservation Reserve Program EIS, supra note 169, at 24,848.
173. The environmental resources considered were: soils, soil and wind erosion
(including air quality), water resources and aquatic species, surface water, total
maximum daily loads (TMDLs), groundwater, floodplains, riparian areas, wet-
lands, vegetation, grasslands, forestlands, invasive species, wildlife, wildlife rec-
reation, and threatened and endangered species. Conservation Reserve Program
EIS, supra note 169, at 24,849.
174. Id.
175. Conservation Reserve Program EIS, supra note 169, at 24,854.
260 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAWREVIEW
this also was the alternative that complied with the 2002 Farm
Bill. 176
An EIS for the commodity programs of the Farm Bill could look
very similar to the one done for CRP. As was the case for CRP, the
EIS of the commodity programs would be done after passage of the
Farm Bill, but before implementation of the programs. An EIS
should be done for each different type of subsidy, since each have
differing policy bases. After providing historical background and an
explanation of the differences of the various commodity programs,
the EIS would present several alternatives. As was done for CRP,
one alternative should consider the environmental impact of having
no commodity subsidy programs. 177 Another alternative might be
based on the programs and funding levels existing prior to the cur-
rent Farm Bill, and still another alternative would be based on FSA
implementing changes to the programs authorized in the current
Farm Bill.' 78 The EIS would then conclude with an explanation of
the rationale for decision for the chosen alternative and a commit-
ment to implementing the program in order to minimize adverse ef-
fects on the environment.
D. An EIS of the Commodity Title of the Farm Bill
It might be argued that the Commodity Title could not be subject
to an EIS due to its large scope. Although different in purpose, CRP
and the commodity subsidy programs are similar in breadth. Like
the commodity subsidy programs of the Farm Bill, CRP is imple-
mented through FSA on behalf of the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion and is a large program with nationwide effects. 179 Currently,
176. Id.
177. Compared to the CRP, which began under the Food Security Act of 1985,
many of the subsidy programs date to the 1930s, so it would be futile to analyze
the environmental effects of never having had subsidies. See also Key, supra note
4, at 1212.
178. These alternatives were considered in the Conservation Reserve Program
EIS, supra note 169, at 24,849. The final alternative considered was the environ-
mental targeting alternative, which would focus program resources on addressing
national or regional priority conservation goals. Id. Similarly, an EIS for the
commodity subsidy programs could consider an alternative with payments based
on environmental stewardship. For an analysis of how these environmental bene-
fits payments might work, see Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill
for 2007, 38 TEX. TECH L. REv. 345, 387-91 (2006).
179. Conservation Reserve Program EIS, supra note 169, at 24,848. In summa-
rizing expected effects of the alternatives on the resources considered, the EIS of
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there are about 782,000 contracts on 441,000 farms in the CRP pro-
gram; 36.8 million acres are enrolled in the program, making CRP
the largest public-private partnership for conservation and wildlife
habitat in the United States. 180 $1.8 billion was given to producers
in the program for the current fiscal year.18 1 While that pales in
comparison to the over $13 billion given in commodity subsidy
payments to farmers in 2005,182 when compared to all conservation
and commodity pa ents to farmers, CRP ranks third in amount of
money disbursed.
Although FSA ultimately adopted the program alternative that
complied with the 2002 Farm Bill, it did so only after analyzing the
environmental ramifications of that and other alternatives. The
analysis might have been biased in favor of the program in the Farm
Bill, as FSA might not have had an option but to adopt that alterna-
tive, since doing otherwise would abrogate the statutory language.
Regardless, by conducting the EIS, FSA incorporated environmental
concerns into its decision-making and met NEPA's procedural man-
date by promising that CRP and its related programs would be im-
plemented "in a manner that provides the greatest amount of benefits
to the environment while causing the least amount of adverse im-
pacts."1 8
4
It is ironic, of course, that the only FSA-administered program to
go through the EIS process is FSA's most environmentally-focused
program. Four alternatives were considered in the EIS. The only
alternative with severe environmental consequences established an
analytical baseline that described what would have happened if CRP
had never been implemented. 185  Analysis under this alternative
CRP noted, "[d]ue to the large programmatic scale of CRP, the timing, location,
and magnitude of the environmental effects will differ under the various alterna-
tives." Id. at 24,849-24,850. The same would hold true of the commodity pro-
grams, but sheer size does not preclude the environmental effects from being con-
sidered.
180. U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA Issues $1.8 Billion in Conservation Reserve
Program Rental Payments, News Release No. 0276.07 (2007), available at
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/newsReleases?area=newsroom&subject=-landing&t
opic=ner&newstype=newsrel&type=detail&item=nr_20071001_rel0276.html
(last visited June 26, 2008).
181. Id.
182. Over $13 billion was given to farmers through commodity programs in
2005. See supra note 64.
183. Id.
184. Conservation Reserve Program EIS, supra note 169, at 24,854.
185. Conservation Reserve Program EIS, supra note 169, at 24,849.
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briefly describes some of the worst environmental problems caused
by farming-soil erosion rates greater than 1.9 billion tons per year,
worsened surface water quality with more streams having a TMDL
listing, approximately 3 million acres of wetlands farmed, and sig-
nificant negative impacts on local wildlife. 18 6  Although largely
lacking in specifics, this analysis could provide a useful starting
point for analyzing the environmental impacts of farm subsidies in
general. It could, at the very least, substantiate the argument that
FSA has received notice that its ongoing commodity programs may
have a significant adverse impact on the quality of the human envi-
ronment.
VI. CONCLUSION: FORCING COMPLIANCE WITH NEPA
Although this paper proposes a large programmatic EIS for the
subsidy programs, it may be that individual EISs, done at the level of
individual farms receiving subsidies, would be better suited to truly
fulfill the requirements imposed by NEPA. The Act contemplates
both broad programmatic impact statements and smaller impact
statements for individual projects. 187 In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the
Supreme Court recognized that when proposals have cumulative or
synergistic effects on the environment, a programmatic EIS must be
done.' 88 In addition, as is the case with regard to commodity subsi-
dies given to individual farms, if the national program permits pri-
vate activity significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment, an impact statement must be done regarding the individual
projects. 189 Kleppe therefore requires both a programmatic envi-
ronmental assessment and individual EISs for smaller actions within
that broad program. For this to happen, an environmental group
would likely have to force the agency to take action via litigation,
and no environmental groups have yet expressed an interest in doing
so.
186. Conservation Reserve Program EIS, supra note 169, at 24,850.
187. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (2007) ("tiering" refers to the coverage of general
matters in broader environmental impacts statements (such as national program or
policy statements) with subsequent narrower statements or environmental analyses
(such as regional or basinwide program statements or ultimately site-specific
statements)).
188. 427 U.S. 390,410 (1976).
189. See id. at 399 (a national coal-leasing program required a programmatic
EIS and individual EISs for individual mines).
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A second possibility for forcing FSA to do an EIS is through the
legislative EIS process. NEPA requires an EIS on proposals for leg-
islation that would significantly affect the quality of the human envi-
ronment.190 A legislative EIS is prepared in the same manner as an
administrative EIS, except that there need not be a scoping process,
and except for certain circumstances, only one statement need be
prepared.191 In Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representa-
tive,192 the DC Circuit upheld the legitimacy of the legislative EIS
and held that APA review of otherwise-final agency actions may be
available.' 93 The fall-out from that decision, however, led many
observers to conclude that legislative EISs are without much
force. 194 FSA regulations do not preclude creation of a legislative
EIS, but state that a legislative EIS may negate the need for the sub-
sequent preparation of a programmatic impact statement when FSA
implements the resulting program. 195 Again, forcing FSA to do a
legislative EIS would probably require litigation.
Since the Farm Service Agency would respond to such litigation
by citing the categorical exclusion of commodity subsidy programs,
a better avenue for action would be through attacking the categorical
exclusion itself. While the promulgation of a new categorical exclu-
sion does not require issuance of an EIS or an EA/FONSI ,196 the
promulgation is nevertheless reviewable by the courts. 197 A cate-
gorical exclusion is held to the same arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard as is other agency action, and an agency must demonstrate that
it made a "reasoned decision" to promulgate a categorical exclusion
based on all the relevant factors and information. 1
98
190. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.8 (2007).
191. Id.
192. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
193. Id. at 552.
194. See, e.g., Dana Butler, Note, The Death Knell of the Legislative Environ-
mental Impact Statement: A Critique of Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, 17 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 121, 121 (1994) (the "decision casts
doubt upon the role of the EIS in many administrative agency-related proposals for
legislation because no agency-prepared materials are truly final until they are im-
plemented or enacted by Congress.").
195. 7 C.F.R. § 799.9(c) (2007).
196. Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1025 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 230 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir.
2000)).
197. See id. at 1026.
198. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Bosworth listed several consid-
erations for analyzing an agency's promulgation of a categorical ex-
clusion. First, the agency's analysis must not be post-hoc.' 99 The
agency is required to engaged in a "scoping process" prior to estab-
lishing the categorical exclusion, in which the agency considers
"cumulative impacts of connected, cumulative, and similar actions,
and is required to produce an [environmental assessment] if the pro-
posed project may have a significant effect on the environment., 20 0
This has emphatically not been done with regard to the commodity
subsidies, since the categorical exclusion was promulgated prior to
the many significant changes made to the commodity programs in
the several farm bills since 1980. The scope of the environmental
impacts cannot possibly have been considered when the full scope of
the commodity programs was then unknown.
Second, the agency must properly assess significance, including
cumulative impacts and when the impact is highly controversial or
the risks uncertain. 20 1 "Categorical exclusions, by definition, are
limited to situations where there is an insignificant or minor effect
on the environment." 20 2 Since "insignificant" is a threshold question
under NEPA, the Farm Service Agency must document that the
commodity subsidies are insignificant.2 0 3 FSA would be hard-
pressed to establish this, given the large amounts of money and the
204large number of farms involved in the subsidy programs.
Third, the categorical exclusion must have the requisite specificity
to ensure that projects taken under it achieve program objectives but
do not individually or cumulatively inflict a significant impact.
205
The categorical exclusion for farm subsidy programs does not go
into great specificity. For instance, it is not explained how the cate-
gorical exclusion fails to meet the four categories of FSA activities
that have or are likely to have significant environment impacts: (1)
legislative proposals, (2) initial program implementation, (3) major
changes in ongoing programs, (4) major environmental concerns
199. Id. at 8.
200. Id. at 9 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3) (2007)).
201. Id. at 9-14.
202. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 859 (9th Cir.
1999) (quoted in Sierra Club, supra note 195, at 1026).
203. Sierra Club, supra note 195, at 1026.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
205. Sierra Club, supra note 195, at 1032 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2007)).
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with ongoing programs.206 Any one of these categories could poten-
tially include the commodity subsidy programs, and therefore, under
FSA regulations, trigger the NEPA process.
Although there are several possibilities for forcing FSA to do an
EIS of the commodity subsidy programs, the success of any of them
remains an open question. The National Environmental Policy Act
is, after all, a statute, and Congress could amend the Act to formally
exclude agricultural programs, as was done with the Clean Water
Act.2°7 Given the public's increasing concern with environmental
problems, this may not be politically possible. Even so, amending
NEPA with regard to the Farm Bill would present Congress the op-
portunity to finally discuss the environmental ramifications of the
agricultural policies it has chosen.
206. 7 C.F.R. § 799.9 (2007).
207. See Ruhl, supra note 94, at 294.

